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Abstract 
What form must a theory of epistemic injustice take in order to successfully 
illuminate the epistemic dimensions of struggles that are primarily political? How 
can such struggles be understood as involving collective struggles for epistemic 
recognition and self-determination that seek to improve practices of knowledge 
production and make lives more liveable? In this paper, I argue that currently 
dominant, Fricker-inspired approaches to theorizing epistemic wrongs and remedies 
make it difficult, if not impossible, to understand the epistemic dimensions of 
historic and ongoing political struggles. Recent work in the theory of recognition—
particularly the work of critical, feminist, and decolonial theorists—can help to 
identify and correct the shortcomings of these approaches. I offer a critical appraisal 
of recent conversation concerning epistemic injustice, focusing on three 
characteristics of Frickerian frameworks that obscure the epistemic dimensions of 
political struggles. I propose that a theory of epistemic injustice can better 
illuminate the epistemic dimensions of such struggles by acknowledging and 
centering the agency of victims in abusive epistemic relations, by conceptualizing 
the harms and wrongs of epistemic injustice relationally, and by explaining 
epistemic injustice as rooted in the oppressive and dysfunctional epistemic norms 
undergirding actual communities and institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
What form must a theory of epistemic injustice take in order to successfully 
illuminate the epistemic dimensions of struggles that are primarily political? How 
can historical and contemporary political struggles be understood as involving 
collective struggles for epistemic recognition and self-determination1 that seek to 
                                                 
1 I understand epistemic self-determination in terms similar to Ian Werkheiser, who 
focuses on “the ability of community members to jointly determine and engage in 
the epistemic practices of their community, which can include methodologies for 
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improve practices of knowledge production for the sake of making lives more 
liveable?  
Answering these questions involves attending to the particularities of distinct 
places, each with their own complex histories and social dynamics. Answering these 
questions well may lead in several directions all at once—in at least as many 
directions as there are distinctive harms and wrongs to be addressed. With this 
pluralistic orientation in mind, I begin by describing the collective struggle with 
which I have been involved for the past several years: a struggle in Michigan to 
restore and deepen local democratic control and to ensure clean, safe, affordable 
water as a basic right for all. I argue that currently dominant, Fricker-inspired 
approaches to theorizing epistemic wrongs and remedies make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to understand the epistemic dimensions of a struggle of this sort. Recent 
work in the theory of recognition—particularly the work of critical, feminist, and 
decolonial theorists—can help to identify and correct the shortcomings of these 
approaches.2  
I begin with a reflective overview of some of my own involvement in 
collective efforts to resist structural epistemic injustice. Next, I offer a critical 
appraisal of recent conversation concerning epistemic injustice, focusing on three 
characteristics of currently dominant, Frickerian frameworks that obscure the 
epistemic dimensions of political struggles and conflicts. Drawing on a shared 
analysis of how community groups in Detroit and Flint are advancing common 
struggles for clean, safe, affordable water as a human right (Howell, Doan, and 
Harbin 2017), I propose that one way a theory of epistemic injustice can better 
illuminate the epistemic dimensions of political struggles is by acknowledging and 
centering the agency of victims in abusive epistemic relations, by conceptualizing 
the harms and wrongs of epistemic injustice relationally, and by explaining 
epistemic injustice as rooted in the oppressive and dysfunctional epistemic norms 
undergirding actual communities and institutions. I leave open the possibility that 
other theories of epistemic injustice, violence, and oppression emerging from 
distinct places and experiences may serve as differently illuminating lenses, with 
                                                 
gaining knowledge as well as evaluative assumptions for accepting or rejecting 
knowledge” (Werkheiser 2017, 158). 
2 Thus, my project diverges from that of Paul Giladi, who argues that a particular 
strand of recognition theory, centered on the work of Axel Honneth, “provides a 
more complex but complementary diagnosis and social cure” for the two forms of 
epistemic injustice described by Fricker (Giladi 2018, 149). I shall instead emphasize 
how the work of critical, feminist, and decolonial theorists of recognition serves as a 
helpful corrective for Fricker-inspired discussions of epistemic injustice. 
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their own tactical advantages. My aim is to fashion one such lens, from where and 
with whom I currently stand. 
 
2. Resisting Structural Epistemic Injustice 
Since 2013, I have been working with grassroots coalitions in Detroit to 
challenge an authoritarian state intervention law known as the “Emergency 
Manager Law,” or Public Act 436. This legislation allows the governor of Michigan to 
appoint an “emergency manager” in cities facing fiscal distress, suspending 
democracy at the municipal level and stripping residents of local citizenship rights 
with the declared purpose of balancing the books. Through my involvement in 
collective efforts to resist Emergency Management—particularly in response to the 
role of emergency managers in creating and sustaining water crises in Detroit and 
Flint—I have grown increasingly concerned with the patterns of group-based 
credibility discounting I have witnessed across the state of Michigan. These patterns 
overwhelmingly target working-class communities of color residing in 
deindustrialized, fiscally distressed cities. In “Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic 
Redlining” (Doan 2017), I argue that such cognitive undermining is rooted in 
Michigan’s legal structure. In the course of so doing, I point out that philosophers 
have been unduly focused on “culprit-based” forms of epistemic injustice (Kwong 
2015, 228) and tend to adopt approaches that preclude discussion of structural 
varieties.  
To more accurately describe the kind of epistemic injustice inflicted on the 
people of Flint, Detroit, and other fiscally distressed, majority-black cities, I develop 
an account of a phenomenon that I call “epistemic redlining,” which is a structural 
form of epistemic injustice not readily countenanced by existing, Frickerian models. 
Whereas redlining refers to the practice of denying financial services (e.g., 
mortgages, home-repair loans) to residents of specific neighborhoods, generally 
because they are people of color and/or poor, I understand epistemic redlining as 
the practice of denying conferrals of credibility to residents of specific 
municipalities, generally because those municipalities are deemed to be in a state of 
“financial emergency” (Doan 2017, 7). Contrary to the general thrust of recent 
Fricker-inspired work on the topic, I argue that epistemic redlining ought to be 
understood as a form of epistemic injustice in spite of the fact that it cannot be 
traced straightforwardly to prejudice and cannot be remedied through the 
cultivation of individual virtue. Since the practices of epistemic redlining and 
Emergency Management are inseparably intertwined, I suggest that the act of 
signing Public Act 436 into law can be understood as “an operation of discursive 
power whereby the state—and capitalist interests that deploy state violence to 
secure their positions—sanctioned and legitimized the misrecognition of certain 
geographically defined populations,” further institutionalizing the epistemic and 
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political subordination of groups already relegated to surplus or disposable statuses 
(Doan 2017, 7).3 
Having developed an alternative account of epistemic injustice that can 
accommodate structural varieties, several pressing questions remained 
unanswered: How can structural epistemic injustice be effectively confronted and 
remedied, if not (solely) through the cultivation of individual virtue? What do 
collective efforts to resist structural epistemic injustice actually look like, particularly 
in the Michigan context? In “Detroit to Flint and Back Again: Solidarity Forever” 
(Howell, Doan, and Harbin 2017), my coauthors and I address these questions while 
recounting how community groups in Detroit and Flint advanced common struggles 
for clean, safe, affordable water as a human right, particularly during the period of 
2014 to 2016. Drawing from activist archives of meeting notes, publications, 
broadcasts, films, and other recordings, together with our own participant 
perspectives on organizing efforts as we experienced them, we explore how Detroit 
and Flint activists managed to center the experiences, voices, and analyses of people 
whose knowledge of water contamination and shutoff practices has not mattered to 
emergency managers, the Department of Treasury, the Department of 
Environmental Quality, or the governor of Michigan.  
Against the background of denigrating portrayals of city residents as 
ignorant, incompetent, and incapable of self-governance—portrayals which, as 
Jamie Peck astutely observes, conform to a neoliberal logic that seeks to 
“endogenize and localize” both the supposedly underlying causes of municipal fiscal 
distress and “the scope for politically acceptable remedies” (Peck 2014)—sharing 
personal stories about water became a central part of efforts to draw attention to 
the crises unfolding in Flint and Detroit. Stories of ordinary peoples’ struggles for 
survival were gradually woven into broader counternarratives that came to inform 
the framings of grassroots journalists and filmmakers, the inquiries pursued by 
community-based researchers, and the focal points of citizen-led policy initiatives, 
as well as various forms of direct action—including the act of civil disobedience in 
                                                 
3 Reflecting on the “age of disposability,” Kali Akuno argues that the “correlation 
between capital accumulation (earning a profit) and the value of Black life to the 
overall system have remained consistent throughout the history of the U.S. settler-
colonial project, despite shifts in production regimes” (Akuno 2017, 62). In the 
context of deindustrialized cities such as Detroit and Flint, in which remaining 
manufacturing industries have mostly replaced human labor through automation, 
the “lack of jobs for Black people translates into a lack of need for Black people, 
which equates into the wholesale devaluation of Black life. And anything without 
value in the capitalist system is disposable” (65).  
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which a group of Detroiters known as the “Homrich 9” blocked private contractors 
from executing water shutoffs.  
We argue that the practice of sharing stories about water in public spaces 
has been “central to efforts to build and expand networks of solidarity, identify and 
process shared trauma, forge a sense of collective identity, and work collaboratively 
toward political transformation” (Howell, Doan, and Harbin 2017, 5). In addition to 
mobilizing those most directly affected by water crises, this practice has helped 
counter the dehumanizing logic of neoliberal governance, “which casts non-experts 
as lacking the credibility to speak truthfully about the quality of the water flowing 
from their taps, let alone about the state of their own health and well-being” (7). As 
ordinary channels of democratic representation were suspended indefinitely under 
Emergency Management, grassroots organizations and communities found ways to 
intervene directly, opening new channels for their voices and analyses, building 
enabling structures to support the sharing of knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed 
to collectively meet each other’s needs, and establishing the infrastructure required 
to meet those needs autonomously and sustainably over time, without relying on 
the state. As Rev. Bill Wiley-Kellermann of St. Peter’s Episcopal Church in Detroit put 
it, “in a situation where the unjust law is an Emergency Manager law, which takes 
over the entire structure of governance, the act of civil disobedience needs to be to 
become ungovernable” (quoted in Howell, Doan, and Harbin 2017, 12). 
Led by black women and other women activists of color who played 
significant roles in building multiracial, intergenerational coalitions within and 
between cities across Michigan, the United States, and globally, the struggle for 
clean, safe, affordable water can be understood as involving an ensemble of 
struggles for epistemic recognition and self-determination. For example, as 
government officials refused to acknowledge Flint residents as knowers, 
disregarding thousands of complaints about diseases and rashes linked to the foul, 
discolored water flowing from their taps, local activists and organizers conducted 
their own water-testing campaigns and offered community-wide trainings. They also 
collaborated selectively with credentialed experts working in academic institutions, 
whose findings would more readily be recognized as legitimate—not to mention 
legally obliging—by those employed by state agencies. In adopting these diverse 
approaches to producing and sharing knowledge, Flint residents demonstrated a 
keen critical awareness of the epistemic values and norms undergirding academic 
and state institutions. Sometimes conforming to specific norms to secure epistemic 
recognition for particular purposes (e.g., working through established channels of 
expertise to force the state to publicly acknowledge the existence of lead and other 
forms of contamination), activists also challenged norms bound up with the 
reproduction of their collective subordination while developing alternative ways of 
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relating to one another as thinkers, inquirers, and collaborators, insisting that the 
knowledge and ways of knowing of ordinary people matter. 
 
3. Theorizing the Epistemic Dimensions of Political Struggles 
3.1. Can there even be a struggle? 
What form must a theory of epistemic injustice take in order to illuminate 
the epistemic dimensions of such a political and structurally oriented struggle? To 
begin with, in order to conceptualize the statewide struggle for clean, safe, 
affordable water as, in part, a struggle for epistemic recognition and self-
determination, a theory of epistemic injustice needs to at least acknowledge the 
agency of victims in abusive epistemic relations, such as relations between 
government officials and city residents. After all, there can be no struggle for 
recognition in situations where the unjustly ignored, silenced, and excluded are 
either unwilling or unable to participate in reshaping the epistemic relations at 
issue, whether by initiating and directing a process of change or by steering 
processes already underway. It is striking, then, that recent work on epistemic 
injustice leaves us sorely ill-equipped for so much as noticing ongoing struggles for 
epistemic recognition, let alone understanding and evaluating them. Why might this 
be the case? 
Consider Miranda Fricker’s treatment of testimonial injustice in her widely 
influential 2007 book, Epistemic Injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs when a 
speaker’s credibility is unduly discounted, and their testimony is not believed, owing 
to a negative, identity-based prejudice in their audience. Fricker offers the example 
of Tom Robinson from Harper Lee’s classic novel, To Kill a Mockingbird. Robinson, a 
black man, has been charged with raping Mayella Ewell, a white woman, and must 
testify before an all-white jury. While it is obvious that Robinson is innocent of the 
crime and speaks truthfully in court, the jury fails to believe his testimony, for their 
credibility judgments are systematically distorted by antiblack prejudice. Robinson is 
not taken seriously in his capacity as a knower and is thereby damaged in his 
standing as a human being. Meanwhile, having written off their only reliable 
informant, the jury issues an under- and misinformed verdict, imprisoning Robinson 
for a crime he did not commit. To prevent such multilayered injustices from 
occurring and to promote more successful testimonial exchanges, Fricker 
recommends cultivating the virtue of testimonial justice, through which the virtuous 
hearer effectively “neutralizes the impact of prejudice in her credibility judgements,” 
rendering her perceptions of her fellow speakers “unprejudiced” (2007, 92, 93; 
original emphasis). 
Since the publication of Epistemic Injustice, a number of philosophers 
working on the topic have joined Fricker in accepting the following two tenets: first, 
credibility discounting must ultimately be traced to prejudice in order to qualify as 
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unjust; and second, there must be an individual remedy, in the form of a specific 
corrective virtue, for each and every variety of unjust discrediting (e.g., Hookway 
2010; Kwong 2015; Marsh 2011; May 2012; Pohlhaus 2012; Riggs 2012). Recall that, 
on Fricker’s view, the withholding of credibility is not necessarily unjust in and of 
itself, and only becomes so when a speaker’s credibility is unduly discounted 
because of an identity-based prejudice in their audience. The guiding thought here is 
that the “ethical poison of testimonial injustice must derive from some ethical 
poison in the judgement of the hearer,” and that identity prejudice, with its 
“ethically bad affective investment” and stubborn resistance to counterevidence, is 
an appropriately poisonous source (Fricker 2007, 22, 36). Prejudice is more than a 
cause of epistemic injustice, for Fricker—it is a criterion that qualifies an instance of 
credibility discounting as an injustice (May 2012, 8). If this first tenet is accepted, 
then the second is likely to seem plausible as well; for if prejudice is an individual 
problem, it can probably be addressed by way of an individual remedy. 
In addition to focusing on individual remedies, Fricker-inspired theories go a 
step further by placing both the responsibility and the initiative for undoing 
testimonial injustice in the hands of individual perpetrators. Given that prejudiced 
hearers are the source of the problem, and they, not their victims, are the ones 
whose testimonial sensibilities need to change, it is reasonable to suppose that they 
bear responsibility for bringing about the requisite psychic changes. More 
specifically, on Fricker’s view it is the responsibility of hearers to exercise critical 
awareness regarding the prejudices that are likely influencing their credibility 
judgments so that their testimonial sensibilities can be checked through a self-
reflective, self-corrective process, guided by the ideal of neutralizing “any negative 
impact” (92). It is up to individual hearers to enact this responsibility by somehow 
coming to suspect the influence of prejudice, “shift[ing] intellectual gear out of 
spontaneous, unreflective mode,” and adjusting their credibility assessments 
upwards to compensate for any undue deficits (91). Fricker suggests that there are 
two mechanisms that might prompt hearers to engage in such self-correction: we 
might either sense some dissonance between our own reasoned beliefs and 
perceptual judgments, or simply begin a process of critical self-reflection on that 
“great passive inheritance that conditions the credibility judgements we make” (41, 
91, 83). Either way, the impetus to self-correction comes from within, and it is up to 
each of us, as individuals, to take up the charge of molding ourselves into more 
virtuous hearers.4 
                                                 
4 In Epistemic Injustice, Fricker does admit that “eradicating these injustices would 
ultimately take not just more virtuous hearers, but collective social political change” 
(Fricker 2007, 7–8). However, since nowhere in her account does she explain the 
relationship between structures of unequal power and systemic prejudices, let alone 
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Fricker’s narrow focus on the initiative and responsibilities of perpetrators is 
surely well-meaning. Insofar as she self-consciously avoids placing the responsibility 
of correcting for testimonial injustice on those who have already been harmed in 
their capacity as knowers, her approach underscores the importance of not further 
burdening the victims, let alone subjecting them to what Nora Berenstain calls 
“epistemic exploitation” (Berenstain 2016).5 Notice, however, that Fricker’s analysis 
of testimonial injustice focuses one-sidedly on the agency and prejudice of 
perpetrators, occluding the agency and resistance of victims. Not only are the 
unjustly discredited, silenced, and excluded, given no role in initiating or guiding the 
work of correcting for testimonial injustice, but the question is left conspicuously 
unasked whether they might also take responsibility for demanding the recognition 
of their oppressors or find themselves moved to press for broader changes in their 
social and material conditions (rather than, say, going around trying to fix all the 
vicious hearers). In an odd twist, Fricker presents the perpetrators of testimonial 
injustice as the chief protagonists of change, driven to mend a damaged web of 
epistemic relations by their own desire to become more virtuous—or, at least, so we 
are invited to hope.6 Meanwhile, their victims are cast as the passive recipients of a 
form of epistemic recognition still to come and seemingly have nothing to do but 
wait patiently for their abusers to come around.7 
                                                 
address the role of political change in working to reduce such prejudices, it is 
difficult to grasp the meaning of her admission. 
5 My thanks to Ami Harbin for drawing my attention to this feature of Fricker’s 
approach. 
6 If hearers begin in vice, in the grips of “active ignorance” (see Mills 2007; Medina 
2013), how exactly would they begin to move into virtue, all on their own? How, for 
example, would they know how far to shift their credibility judgments upwards to 
correct for undue deficits? My thanks to Chris Cohoon for drawing my attention to 
these questions. 
7 Fricker arguably has more to say about the agency of victims in her discussion of 
hermeneutical injustice—see, for example, her remarks on “hermeneutical 
rebellion,” which she casts as “part of the mechanism of consciousness raising” 
(Fricker 2007, 167). Whether her thinking might be able to move further in the 
structurally oriented direction, I am suggesting, remains to be seen, though. One 
question is whether such meaning-making activity ought to be considered the 
foremost art of resistance, especially given the way Fricker renders its success 
dependent on the uptake of perpetrators and on the incorporation of new terms 
into the “collective” hermeneutical resource (cf. Mason 2011). Another is how to 
understand the relationship between what Fricker now calls “discriminatory 
epistemic injustice,” on the one hand, and “systemic riggings of the epistemic 
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Compelling though it has turned out to be for many philosophers, this 
picture of how epistemic injustice can and ought to be remedied should give us 
pause. I suspect that its plausibility ultimately rests on the idea that prejudiced 
hearers are the source of the problem, and since only the hearers themselves can 
come to believe and perceive otherwise, they not only can but must perform the 
requisite epistemic labor on their own, out of their own good will. But even if that 
argument were convincing, there would still be plenty of reason to resist Fricker’s 
conclusion that vicious hearers must be the sole initiators and protagonists of 
change. For one thing, Linda Martín Alcoff and Rae Langton have independently 
interrogated Fricker’s (largely unsupported) presumption that perpetrators could 
reliably serve in that role, emphasizing the need for structural remedies to 
complement and pave the way for the cultivation of individual virtue (Alcoff 2010, 
132–134; Langton 2010, 462–463; see also Anderson 2012, 167–169; Medina 2013; 
Emerick 2016, 178–181). As Kristie Dotson points out, we also need to be mindful of 
various sources of “epistemic inertia” within and among perpetrators of epistemic 
oppression, ranging from “the social, political, and historical landscapes of epistemic 
power” to “features of epistemological systems themselves” (Dotson 2014, 134). 
The character of resistance to change is likely to vary across historical and cultural 
circumstances. It may include everything from an inability or reluctance to so much 
as recognize the need to alter one’s own epistemic sensibilities, to a lack of impetus 
to pursue changes one accepts as obligatory (Dotson 2014, 132–133, 129).  
In summary, there is good reason to suspect that Fricker’s account puts an 
inordinate amount of faith in the perpetrators of epistemic injustice. By accepting 
her depiction of epistemic injustice as rooted in the prejudices of individuals, 
philosophers following Fricker’s lead run the risk of uncritically inheriting her faith in 
the self-redemptive initiative of perpetrators and, in so doing, occluding and treating 
as irrelevant the agency of victims. As a consequence, Fricker’s theory of epistemic 
injustice prevents us from so much as noticing historic and ongoing struggles for 
epistemic recognition and self-determination, such as those currently being waged 
in Detroit, Flint, and other cities subjected to authoritarian rule. Yet it is precisely in 
those situations where perpetrators of epistemic injustice demonstrate an 
unwillingness or inability to change their ways that the need to demand and press 
for change becomes most urgent—not to mention in those situations where it is the 
perceived legitimacy of specific conventions, laws, and institutions, and not just the 
stubbornness of those who happen to be charged with implementing them, that is 
the principal source of epistemic inertia. Not only does Fricker’s account ignore 
                                                 
economy,” on the other, which she characterizes as a distinct species of epistemic 
wrongs but does not discuss any further (Fricker 2017, 53; original emphasis). 
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situations where it becomes necessary to engage in struggles for epistemic 
recognition and self-determination in the face of persistent harms—it makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to recognize the possibility of struggles already underway. 
By allowing the victims in abusive epistemic relations to recede into the 
background, philosophers following Fricker’s lead also fail to consider the extent to 
which the power to inflict injury through the withholding of credibility depends on a 
prior history of recognitive relations and acts. Thus, important questions are left 
unasked about how we go about investing authority in one another in and through 
our ongoing relationships, and how relations of power and vulnerability come to be 
intertwined with assessments of credibility, among other evaluative qualities. Why 
have such questions been left unaddressed? Much as recent work in the theory of 
recognition has been shaped by what Cillian McBride calls a “recognition deficit 
model” (McBride 2013, 6, 37–38), Fricker-inspired theories of epistemic injustice 
generally take for granted what might be called a “credibility deficit model.” The 
basic picture here is that of a relationship between a subject whose credibility is 
denied, waiting for—or, perhaps, demanding—epistemic recognition from another 
who has the power to remedy this deficit by conferring the credibility that is 
warranted by the available evidence. Since the focus is on the harms done through 
the withholding of credibility, the solution is thought to be the granting of due or 
appropriate credibility by way of ameliorating the distorting influence of prejudice. 
The guiding ideal is that of a society of hearers who are generally unprejudiced and 
who skillfully hew to operative epistemic norms, managing to minimize, if not 
entirely eliminate, instances of unjust credibility discounting.  
Yet as McBride, Kelly Oliver, Amy Allen, and Glen Coulthard each point out, 
pictures of this sort divert our attention away from questions about “the way our 
desires for recognition from particular groups, individuals, and institutions are 
formed in the first place,” and whether such desires might themselves be a product 
of social domination, as we accommodate ourselves to structurally asymmetrical 
modes of recognition (McBride 2013, 6; see also Oliver 2001, 9, 26; Allen 2010, 26–
31; Coulthard 2014, 23–25). “Sometimes we would be better off if we did not desire 
the recognition of some people in the first place,” adds McBride, “because it is this 
desire itself which helps to render us subordinate to them” (104). Suppose my self-
confidence is seriously shaken by your judgment of my epistemic competence, and 
you thereby harm me in my capacity as a knower. If, in light of my having been 
harmed in this way, I am demanding the credibility I am due, then it must be that I 
already recognize your authority over me, at least insofar as I have come to see you 
as a credible judge of my cognitive abilities (see Markell 2003, 31–32; McBride 2013, 
151). I could be right in my assessment of you. But, then again, my judgment of you 
may well be just as vulnerable to the influence of misleading stereotypes as is yours 
of me, conditioned as our assessments of credibility are by the “great passive 
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inheritance” of our generation (Fricker 2007, 83). I might, for example, see you as far 
more competent than you actually are, taken as I am by your finely tailored suit and 
Ivy League credentials, having yet to reflect critically on this corner of the prevailing 
social imaginary. Or, as Estelle Ferrarese points out, suppose I recognize your 
authority not because I acknowledge you as a competent judge, but only insofar as 
your assessment of me plays a mediating role in my gaining access to certain 
resources (Ferrarese 2009, 611), such as gainful employment or safe drinking water. 
Unless you acknowledge my status as a knower and are prepared to believe at least 
some of what I say, I will not be able to acquire whatever it is that I want or need, 
for you control the resources in question. You may even hold a monopoly, rendering 
me wholly dependent on your largesse.  
In situations of either sort, my vulnerability to you—that is, to the very 
possibility that you might deny me the credibility I am due—could very well be 
shaped by factors that have little to do with your actual competence and authority, 
some of which are entirely outside my control. Insofar as I am able to alter my 
attitude towards you (perhaps by denying the legitimacy of your judgment in light of 
good reasons) without suffering serious consequences, it may turn out that your 
authority over me, and your power to harm me in my capacity as a knower, is 
rendered precarious or nonexistent in turn. So, in addition to occluding the agency 
of victims by focusing exclusively on the responsibilities of perpetrators, Fricker-
inspired theories also sidestep some crucial questions of power and authority, and 
thereby fail to do justice to the complexities of epistemic relations—complexities 
that only come fully into view when considered from below. Once we start raising 
questions about the processes through which authority and power are invested and 
maintained in ongoing relationships, there begin to emerge new possibilities for 
resisting epistemic injustice at both the interpersonal and structural levels. We can 
also begin to understand what struggles for epistemic recognition and self-
determination might ultimately be about and what tends to move people into 
engagement in struggles of these sorts. 
 
3.2. Is struggle really necessary? 
In the previous section, I noted that Fricker’s view ignores situations where it 
becomes necessary to engage in struggles for epistemic recognition and self-
determination, particularly in the face of persistent—in some cases, institutionally 
embedded—epistemic inertia. I will now argue that the necessity of struggle is 
further obscured by the way Fricker characterizes the harms and wrongs of 
epistemic injustice. To anticipate: by conceiving of epistemic injustice in 
individualistic terms, Fricker-inspired theories draw attention away from social 
relations and institutions that subordinate people and groups on epistemic grounds, 
precluding consideration of efforts to redress what are arguably more fundamental 
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wrongs. Drawing on Nancy Fraser’s recent work in the theory of recognition, in what 
follows, I sketch out an alternative approach to characterizing the harms and wrongs 
of epistemic injustice that helps explain why engaging in a struggle for epistemic 
recognition may sometimes be necessary to redress relevant injuries. 
On Fricker’s view, the primary ethical harm in all cases of epistemic injustice 
is that “the subject is wronged in her capacity as a knower” (Fricker 2007, 44). 
Fricker discusses two main types of epistemic injustice: testimonial and 
hermeneutical. On the one hand, testimonial injustice wrongs a subject in her 
capacity as a giver of knowledge. It also tends to cause any of a number of 
secondary practical harms, such as making someone appear unqualified for a job; as 
well as secondary epistemic harms, such as shaking someone’s confidence in her 
own beliefs. As Fricker puts it, “testimonial injustice, and the attack it makes on 
intellectual confidence, can change an intellectual trajectory in one fell blow, 
whether as a single event or, more likely, as the final straw in an ongoing experience 
of persistent petty intellectual underminings” (51). On the other hand, 
hermeneutical injustice wrongs a subject by excluding her from participating in the 
pooling of knowledge, insofar as it renders her unable “to make communicatively 
intelligible something which it is particularly in his or her interests to be able to 
render intelligible” (162). The secondary epistemic harms of hermeneutical injustice 
include the erosion of a subject’s faith in “her own ability to make sense of the 
world, or at least the relevant region of the world” (163), the practical side-effects of 
which are both serious and wide ranging.  
In summary, Fricker conceives of the harms and wrongs of epistemic injustice 
in terms of the damage inflicted on an individual’s cognitive capacities. When 
somebody suffers an injustice of this kind, the wrong inflicted on her “bears a social 
meaning” to the effect that she is “less than fully human,” for the degradation of her 
capacities qua knower symbolically degrades her qua human being (44; original 
emphasis). But she also suffers concretely, both as result of this symbolic 
degradation and from psychic injuries inflicted more directly.8 By attacking her 
intellectual confidence and potentially throwing her off of her intellectual trajectory, 
epistemic injustice threatens an individual’s capacity for autonomous thought and 
action. As Fricker puts it, epistemic injustice is “capable of running both deep and 
wide in a person’s psychology and practical life,” constraining “who the person can 
be” (58). On Fricker’s view, then, epistemic injustice is an impediment to the ethical 
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that Fricker’s discussion of “epistemic objectification” leaves 
open the possibility that one might be wronged by testimonial injustice without also 
suffering any concrete damages (Fricker 2007, 132–136). My thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point. 
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self-realization of individuals and, hence, “presents a face of oppression” (58). Since 
the focus is on harms done by the withholding of credibility and exclusion from 
hermeneutic participation, the solution is thought to be the granting of epistemic 
recognition and inclusion in existing practices of meaning-making. 
I agree that individual knowers often suffer psychic damage as a result of 
epistemic injustice and that the extent of the damage can be so serious as to limit 
their prospects for full-fledged self-direction and self-realization. My concern, 
though, is that by focusing on the psyches of individual victims (which mirrors how 
Fricker locates the source of the problem, in the psyches of individual perpetrators), 
Fricker-inspired views draw attention away from other injurious features of abusive 
epistemic relations that not only tend to move people into struggles for epistemic 
recognition, but also help them come to grips with the inadequacy of being granted 
credibility or included in practices of meaning-making in the absence of significant 
struggle or conflict.  
In order to illuminate the epistemic dimensions of ongoing political struggles, 
I think we would do better to conceptualize the harms and wrongs of epistemic 
injustice relationally. Born of her celebrated exchange with Axel Honneth (Fraser 
and Honneth 2003), Nancy Fraser’s “status model of recognition” is particularly 
helpful for envisioning the type of approach needed here. The status model 
encourages us to reconceptualize various forms of epistemic nonrecognition and 
misrecognition (such as the withholding of credibility or the denial of another’s 
status as a knower) as institutionalized relations of status subordination—violations 
of justice in their own right—rather than merely as vehicles of psychic injury or 
impediments to self-realization.9 From the perspective of an extended status model, 
epistemic injustice occurs whenever “institutions structure interactions according to 
cultural norms that impede parity of participation” (Fraser 2003, 29), preventing 
people from testifying and being heard, asking relevant questions, contesting claims 
and standards of evidence, and otherwise participating in everyday epistemic 
practices as peers.  
The status model of epistemic recognition helps us to see the withholding 
(and in some cases, the granting) of credibility as one of many distinctive means of 
subordination that, once institutionalized, serve to reproduce social hierarchies over 
time. For example, we might think of the subordination of factory workers to their 
professionalized managers and owning-class employers as partly a function of those 
“institutionalized patterns of cultural value” (50) that elevate largely propositional, 
theoretical, and technical forms of knowledge over various forms of implicit 
                                                 
9 Although Fraser’s focus is not on epistemic recognition, I am proposing that her 
view be extended in this direction so that it can speak to relations of epistemic 
subordination as well. 
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knowing, including non- or potentially propositional, skill-based, and affective 
modes of understanding (see Shotwell 2011, 2017). In the context of present-day 
Michigan, we might also consider to what extent certain hierarchical valuations of 
ways of knowing have been codified into law, such that working-class black and 
brown communities end up systematically subordinated to the dictates of unelected 
technocrats. When the “fiscal responsibility” of local governments comes to be 
regarded as a proxy for the credibility of entire populations, what types of 
knowledge and ways of knowing are simultaneously elevated and degraded by the 
state legislature? According to what patterns of cultural value can the ability to self-
govern be reduced to the ability to meet one’s financial obligations to major banks? 
What norm of credibility is being reinforced or established through legislative 
means? 
The status model of epistemic recognition locates the fundamental wrong of 
epistemic injustice in social relations and institutions, rather than in individual or 
interpersonal psychology, without thereby denying the importance of healing and 
redressing the psychological suffering and incapacitation produced through various 
forms of social hierarchy and domination. It also suggests that epistemic injustice is 
rooted in deeply embedded patterns of cultural value on the basis of which 
institutional norms are constructed and enacted, and not only in identity-based 
prejudices, which are but one of many modes through which we invest value in one 
another. Finally, since the existence of impediments to parity of epistemic 
participation can be demonstrated regardless of whether the victims suffer any 
significant psychic injuries or distorted self-relationships, Fraser’s model also makes 
epistemic injustice more readily identifiable, owing to its public verifiability. 
Of course, this is not to suggest that the status model makes the work of 
remedying epistemic injustice any easier. For one thing, given that the fundamental 
wrong of epistemic injustice lies in the character of social relations and in how these 
relations are structured by institutions of various kinds, Fricker’s proposed solution 
is clearly inadequate, focused as it is on individual remedies and the self-redemptive 
initiative of perpetrators. As Glen Coulthard points out, the granting of recognition 
by the dominant partner in a relationship may well modify the structure of 
domination in certain important respects, but the subject position of the 
subordinated party remains unchanged (Coulthard 2014, 39). This is especially the 
case in real-world contexts of domination, such as those of ongoing settler-colonial 
projects in the United States and Canada, where the values and terms underwriting 
recognitive relations “end up being determined by and in the interests of the 
hegemonic partner” (23).  
In such contexts, Coulthard argues convincingly that engaging in struggle 
serves as a necessary “mediating force,” holding out the promise of “fundamental 
self-transformation” (39). By initiating a struggle for epistemic recognition, the 
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subordinated parties at least stand a chance of shedding their current identities, 
altering their subject positions in and through the process of actively reshaping the 
terms and character of their interactions with others. “Without conflict and 
struggle,” writes Coulthard, “the terms of recognition tend to remain in the 
possession of those in power to bestow on their inferiors in ways they deem 
appropriate” (39; see also Oliver 2001, 24; Markell 2003, 30; Laden 2007, 278–279). 
To reestablish themselves as “truly self-determining,” Coulthard suggests that the 
subordinated will need to demand epistemic recognition in terms other than those 
prescribed by and exclusively serving the interests of those in positions of greater 
power, taking it upon themselves to become “creators of the terms, values, and 
conditions by which they are to be recognized” (39). As Anthony Laden emphasizes, 
unlike a simple demand for the credibility they are due according to current 
standards, the subordinated would then be demanding “that the powerful give 
something up: in particular, the ability to impose identities on others.” Hence, “it is 
much less clear that the mere articulation of the demand will motivate the powerful 
to accede,” reinforcing the need to struggle for equal status as epistemic and 
political agents (Laden 2007, 278–279).  
 
3.3. Over what are we struggling? 
In the previous section I argued that Fricker’s theory of epistemic injustice 
obscures the necessity of engaging in struggles for epistemic recognition and self-
determination in contexts of domination. I will now argue that her account prevents 
us from understanding an important aspect of what such struggles are ultimately 
about—that is, what the victims of abusive epistemic relations are often best 
positioned to collectively recognize and struggle against, and what sorts of goals, 
epistemic and otherwise, they are generally inclined to struggle for. I contend that, 
in order to more fully illuminate the epistemic dimensions of historic and ongoing 
political struggles, epistemic injustice ought to be understood as rooted in the 
oppressive and dysfunctional epistemic norms undergirding actual communities and 
institutions. By adopting this alternative explanatory approach, I believe we put 
ourselves in a much better position to understand how political struggles often 
come to be motivated, in part, by a desire to improve practices of knowledge 
production for the sake of making lives more liveable.  
Recall that Fricker conceptualizes epistemic injustice in terms of the misuse 
of the norm of credibility due to the distorting influence of prejudice. For example, 
in the case of Tom Robinson, it is not that the jury is simply unaware of the usual 
“markers” of credibility that community members rely on when assessing one 
another (Fricker 2007, 71) and simply fail, out of sheer ignorance, to notice that 
Robinson possesses these markers. Rather, the jury’s perception of Robinson is 
systematically distorted by their shared antiblack imaginings, such that the markers 
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of credibility they would have noticed in Robinson, but for his perceived blackness, 
are not recognized as such.  
As a number of Fricker’s critics have pointed out, this explanatory approach 
ignores the possibility that it is not always and only a lack of conformity to operative 
epistemic norms, but rather the skillful conformity to those norms that can result in 
unjust patterns of discrediting, silencing, and epistemic exclusion, regardless of 
whether prejudice is also in play (see Dotson 2014; Ayala and Vasilyeva 2015; Ayala 
2016; Doan 2017). If the principal problem is that the operative norm of credibility is 
itself epistemically dysfunctional in ways that predictably give rise to “pernicious 
ignorance” (Dotson 2011, 238), contributing thereby to the epistemic 
marginalization of groups along lines of gender, race, class, and other dimensions of 
identity, then solutions focused solely on the psychological constitution of 
individuals will only scratch the surface of a far more complicated situation. By way 
of contrast, Saray Ayala’s approach to accounting for and remedying discursive 
injustice calls for “high-level interventions on the norms and conventions governing 
discourse” (Ayala 2016, 884), whereas Dotson’s approach to remedying epistemic 
oppression emphasizes the need for socially dominant groups to become “aware of 
their larger epistemological systems . . . so as to possibly change them or shift out of 
them entirely” (Dotson 2014, 131). My proposed approach to resisting structural 
epistemic injustice focuses on the importance of examining the epistemic 
assumptions undergirding legislation at the state level, while tracking how these 
assumptions are gradually legitimized and normalized through the practices allowed 
by specific laws, and by the political distinctions these laws enact (Doan 2017). Each 
of these alternatives relies on the insight that practices of epistemic recognition 
need to be historicized, directing our attention to the processes through which 
epistemic values and norms are institutionalized—whether at the level of social 
imaginaries, discursive conventions, or systems of laws and legislation. In other 
words, these approaches resonate with the words of Axel Honneth, who argues 
that, “the distinctively human dependence on intersubjective recognition is always 
shaped by the particular manner in which the mutual granting of recognition is 
institutionalized within a society” (Honneth 2003, 138).  
By way of contrast, Fricker takes for granted the universal acceptability and 
applicability of a particular, largely unexamined norm of credibility, the justification 
for which is independent of the actual, historical practices of human communities.10 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, this has not always been the case. In a paper published nearly ten 
years prior to Epistemic Injustice, Fricker entertained the view that a norm of 
credibility might itself be corrupted by social pressures, rather than just distorted in 
its use by prejudice. There she suggests that “there is likely (at least in societies 
recognizably like ours) to be some social pressure on the norm of credibility to 
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Here is it important to note that Fricker’s disagreement with Honneth, Ayala, 
Dotson, and myself is methodological as well as substantive in nature. In Epistemic 
Injustice, Fricker appeals to a fictional State of Nature scenario in order to argue that 
the virtues of accuracy and sincerity are both natural and universal, for they arise in 
response to epistemic needs that are “absolutely basic” in human communities 
(Fricker 2007, 112). So, too, with the virtue of epistemic justice: this virtue is 
exhibited by those who manage to correct their identity-based prejudices in order to 
more reliably track the accuracy and sincerity of possible informants, given that 
these are the two universal markers of credibility (114–120). Returning to the 
example of Tom Robinson: when the jurors fail to notice Robinson’s accuracy and 
sincerity due to their antiblack prejudice, it would seem that they are failing to 
conform to a norm of credibility that, on Fricker’s view, not only might but “must 
arise in human society,” alongside the two corresponding virtues of truthfulness 
(112; original emphasis).  
Whereas Fricker finds the State of Nature construction useful in building a 
case for a form of universalism regarding epistemic values and norms, others are 
more circumspect about the costs of adopting an ahistorical approach. Arguing 
against ahistorical accounts of recognition in particular, Honneth insists that 
subjective expectations of recognition cannot be derived from any historically 
transcendent source (Honneth 2003, 138). Instead, we need to examine the norms 
embedded in actual, historical practices of recognition, which are gradually 
sedimented into “relatively stable expectations that we can understand as the 
subjective expression of social integration” (174). Honneth’s historically and 
institutionally oriented approach leads him to endorse what he calls a moderate 
value realism, according to which the evaluative qualities of a person or group 
“represent the certainties of our life-world, whose character can be subject to 
historical modifications” (Honneth 2007, 333). According to Honneth, then, “We 
should understand recognition as a reaction with which we respond rationally to 
evaluative qualities we have learned to perceive in human subjects to the degree 
that we have been integrated into the second nature of our life-world” (336), rather 
than as a reaction to qualities presumed to be both natural and universal.  
One appealing feature of Honneth’s approach is that it reveals prevailing 
epistemic values and norms as the products of past struggles for recognition, 
undertaken by inherently fallible and limited beings such as ourselves. Honneth’s 
approach is also compatible with an important insight of many feminist 
epistemologists, that in historicizing practices of epistemic recognition we need not 
abandon claims to the effect that particular struggles have succeeded in improving 
                                                 
imitate the structures of social power” (Fricker 1998, 170). It not entirely clear why 
Fricker later decided to abandon a structural analysis for a psychological one. 
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our practices of knowledge-seeking, nor need we abandon a commitment to finding 
new ways of improving current practices. As Heidi Grasswick argues, “Social 
practices of knowing are transformed in positive ways by members of communities 
critically reflecting on their communal commitments to current standards, theories, 
and methods, and determining that a shift in some of these commitments would 
better serve their needs, epistemic and otherwise” (Grasswick 2004, 106). In order 
to account for the possibility of such positive transformations, we need a theory of 
epistemic injustice that is capable of conceptualizing the “dynamic relationship 
between the epistemic agents—as active reflective inquirers—and the standards 
and existing practices of knowing that they have access to through their 
communities” (97). We also need a theory that can help us chart the connections 
between different sets of standards, the normative statuses and relations they play 
a role in legitimating, and the patterns of epistemic participation to which these 
statuses and relations give rise. 
Given that the victims of abusive epistemic relations are often best 
positioned to collectively recognize and struggle against the persistence of 
epistemic norms that institutionalize relations of subordination, how might a theory 
of epistemic injustice go about conceptualizing the goals, epistemic and otherwise, 
that such agents are inclined to struggle for? Returning to the work of Nancy Fraser, 
I propose that her distinction between affirmative and transformative strategies for 
redressing injustice can help us distinguish among different approaches to 
understanding and remedying epistemic injustice. On Fraser’s view, an affirmative 
strategy is one that aims to “correct inequitable outcomes of social arrangements 
without disturbing the underlying social structures that generate them” (Fraser 
2003, 74). Thus, a strategy is “affirmative” insofar as it affirms the reproduction of 
the social structures in question—and in cases of epistemic injustice, when it affirms 
the epistemic norms undergirding those structures. For example, Fricker’s approach 
to remedying testimonial and hermeneutical injustice seems to qualify as an 
affirmative strategy: it aims to correct credibility judgments distorted by prejudice 
without calling into question the underlying norm of credibility guiding our 
assessments of one another or the broader communal practices and social 
institutions in which this norm is (allegedly) embedded. Insofar as Fricker’s strategy 
aims to improve practices of knowledge production, it is by encouraging the 
granting of credibility to a wider range of people who truly merit it, working against 
the epistemic marginalization of individual members of socially disadvantaged 
groups by including such individuals in formerly exclusive practices of meaning-
making. As Alcoff points out, Fricker’s notion of justice and virtue is driven by an aim 
familiar to many corporate diversity campaigns: “the aim of neutrality, that is, the 
aim of becoming inured to either unearned privilege or undeserved demerit” (Alcoff 
2010, 134). Since Fricker takes for granted the universal acceptability and 
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applicability of a particular norm of credibility, justified independently of exiting 
social reality, the only remaining challenge is to ensure conformity to this norm with 
a view to properly sorting out the deserving from the undeserving. 
By way of contrast, a transformative strategy aims to “correct unjust 
outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework” (Fraser 
2003, 74). Thus, a strategy is “transformative” insofar as it aims to resist the 
reproduction of the social structures in question while also contributing to a process 
of radical restructuring. In cases of epistemic injustice, a transformative strategy is 
one that seeks to create new terms, values, and conditions by which people are to 
recognize one another as thinkers, knowers, and collaborators, contributing thereby 
to broader processes of social, economic, and political restructuring. For example, 
efforts to resist Emergency Management in Michigan can be understood as 
transformative in orientation, insofar as they are rooted in a critique of systematic 
water, housing, and education deprivation, on the one hand, and a critique of the 
particular manner in which the epistemic non- and misrecognition of entire 
populations has been institutionalized by the state legislature, on the other. By 
highlighting lawmakers’ roles in installing and legitimizing oppressive and 
dysfunctional epistemic norms, these efforts avoid the dangerous mistake of 
presuming that a norm justified independently of existing social reality must also be 
operative in real-world contexts of domination. Instead, Flint and Detroit activists 
have demonstrated a keen critical awareness of the epistemic norms embedded in 
actual, historical practices of recognition and of how those norms have gradually 
been sedimented into the relatively stable expectations of individuals and groups. 
Without affirming the norms undergirding academic and state institutions, they 
have sometimes conformed to specific norms as a way of securing recognition for 
particular purposes, conscious of the fact that access to tightly controlled resources, 
such as clean drinking water, is sometimes predicated on such performances 
(Ferrarese 2009, 611), and that “outward conformity does not signal any real 
acceptance of the authority of the norms themselves” (McBride 2013, 154). The 
practice of sharing personal stories about water contamination and shutoff practices 
in public spaces has helped to unsettle degrading expectations concerning the 
knowledge and ways of knowing of ordinary people, indirectly challenging the 
dehumanizing logic of neoliberal governance, undermining the legitimacy of state 
officials and their policies, and shifting public consciousness around the human right 
to water. By directly enacting epistemic norms that subvert the logic of authoritarian 
rule—and that go even further, challenging the adequacy of a return to previous 
structures of democratic representation—the statewide struggle for the human 
right to clean, safe, affordable water reveals itself as a struggle to begin anew, by 
listening anew. 
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that one way a theory of epistemic injustice can 
better illuminate the epistemic dimensions of political struggles is, first, by 
acknowledging and centering the agency of victims in abusive epistemic relations, 
rather than occluding them; second, by conceptualizing the harms and wrongs of 
epistemic injustice relationally, rather than individualistically; and third, by 
explaining epistemic injustice as rooted in the oppressive and dysfunctional 
epistemic norms undergirding actual communities and institutions, rather than 
focusing exclusively on the distorting influence of prejudice. While I have assumed 
throughout that a theory of epistemic injustice ought to be capable of illuminating 
the epistemic dimensions of struggles that are primarily political, I appreciate that 
this particular desideratum is not self-evidently desirable. In closing, then, I shall 
speak briefly to the advantages of the approach outlined above. 
Attending to the epistemic dimensions of political struggles has at least two 
distinctive advantages. First, there is a longstanding tendency in philosophical 
discussions of epistemic injustice to propose remedies for specific problems without 
first considering how such proposals have tended to work out in practice. Although 
the first published reviews of Epistemic Injustice brought this issue to the fore (Alcoff 
2010, Langton 2010), the reception of these critiques has been mixed. By drawing 
attention to the epistemic labor involved in today’s transformative social 
movements, I hope both to invite more empirically oriented reflection on the merits 
and limits of proposals already on offer and to broaden the range of proposals 
deemed worthy of consideration. In other words, we should want to illuminate the 
epistemic dimensions of political struggles because we should be prepared to 
embrace more engaged, epistemically responsible philosophical research. Second, 
attending to real-world struggles for epistemic recognition and self-determination 
opens up possibilities for understanding and working to improve practices of 
knowledge-seeking not otherwise available to us. While checking our own 
prejudices is undoubtedly important, self-corrective practices need not be coupled 
with an uncritical affirmation of prevailing epistemic norms. Given that, as Ruth 
Wilson Gilmore puts it, “norms change along with forms” (Gilmore 2007, 43), it is 
difficult to understand how genuine improvements in practices of knowledge 
production are possible in the absence of protracted, dual-sided struggles to 
transform both ourselves and our institutions.  
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